Reconstructing American Legal Realism Logically

ABSTRACT
We are concerned in this paper to establish the rationality of American legal
realism by adopting a theory of reconstruction. American realism is plagued with
dichotomies in relating theory and practice; and the need to broach these
dichotomies involves transcendence of experience and transference of
consciousness. In doing this, we have both to excavate and to justify its
philosophy, logic and science. American legal realism has its root in the
philosophy of pragmatism and a logic that sets out the essential elements
associated with the making and determination of the law through instrumentality
of the court. The validity of this category of legal theory tends to lie on the extent
of immediate use to which law can be put or the benefits it can afford the
American society. Believing in the possibility of a realistic theory of law that is
purely American precludes belief in universal understanding of human legal
experience distinct from the understanding gained through the cultural lenses of
the American people. Although American realists differ remarkably even within
a single paradigm, nevertheless three areas of logical unity among them are that:
They bear a cross relevance, a complementing and interlocking of results, and a
similar faith in attacking legal problems.